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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of changes in the public debt-GDP ratio
on long, 10 year, interest rates in a panel of 17 countries over the period
1870-2016 controlling for other variables, in particular the world interest
rate. Over this long period one can argue that most of the big changes
in public debt were the product of factors largely exogenous to national
interest rate determination, such as war, depression or financial crisis.The
issue is of current relevance since the covid-19 pandemic has caused large
increases in the ratio of public debt to GDP in many countries. The
estimates suggest that it is the change in debt, rather than the level of
debt or the deficit, that matters for long interest rates. World interest
rates have long and short run effects on interest rates which are very well
determined and close to one. Current inflation has a small but significant
effect.
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1 Introduction
There is a widespread belief that government deficits and national debt above
certain limits have a negative effect on the economy, raising interest rates and
lowering growth. For instance, the European Union Maastricht criteria for euro
convergence specify that the government deficit to GDP ratio must not exceed
3% and the debt to GDP ratio must not exceed 60%. This paper examines this
belief by looking at the effect of both the ratio of government deficit to GDP
and of public debt to GDP on long, 10 year, government bond interest rates. It
uses the Jorda-Schularick-Taylor, JST, macrohistory database, which provides
data over 1870-2016 for a panel of 17 countries.1
Although the focus of this paper is on the long term relationship, the issue
of the effect of debt on interest rates is of some relevance in 2020 given that
the covid-19 pandemic has induced increases in public expenditure at the time
when tax revenue is falling because of lockdown.
Over this long historical span, these countries saw large changes in public
debt, which were plausibly exogenous to national interest rate determination,
being the product of war, depression or financial crisis. The long interest rate is
the focus because it is typically the rate at which the government finances debt
and is more likely to be market determined than the short interest rate, which
is used for policy purposes. In the market the equilibrium interest rate will be
determined by the balance between borrowers and savers. The large exogenous
shocks, like wars and crises, which cause government borrowing to increase, will
also influence private borrowing for investment and private saving. Although
there is no data on private debt over this period that would allow investigation
of the hypothesis, one might suppose that large negative shocks like wars would
increase uncertainty and depress private borrowing and increase private saving.
Thus in the interest rate equation the coeffi cient of debt does not capture a pure
ceteris paribus effect but the joint effect of what tends to happen at the same
time as the changes in debt.2 Pesaran & Smith (2014) discuss the arguments
in favour of allowing for such indirect effects that arise due to the historical
correlations amongst the regressors.
The empirical model used in this paper for country specific long interest
rates controls not just for debts and deficits but also for the world interest rate,
the cross section average of the 17 countries for that year. This captures the
global balance between borrowing and saving and proves highly significant with
a coeffi cient close to one. This is in accord with a range of recent literature,
including Del Negro et al. (2018), Jorda & Taylor (2019) and Rachel & Summers
(2019), which emphasises the comovement of national interest rates and the way
that global forces determine their course over the medium to long run. Rachel
& Summers (2019) treat the advanced economies as a fully integrated bloc and
1Jorda et al. (2017, 2019). The countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and USA.
2Notice that instrumenting debt using a war/crisis variable does not solve the problem
because this is correlated with the omitted variables, desired private borrowing and saving.
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suggest that the 300 basis point decline in the global real rate since 1980 would
have been substantially greater but for the buildup of government deficits and
debt over the last generation and the increasing generosity of social insurance
programs, particularly old age pensions. The role of demographic influences on
interest rates is analysed in Aksoy et al. (2019).
Over this long historical span it may be reasonable to treat the bulk of the
variation in the share of public debt as plausibly exogenous. This was the posi-
tion of Barro (1987) who regarded wars as providing exogenous and transitory
variations in UK government spending, for which it was optimal to use debt
financing to smooth tax and consumption. The two arguments that might be
made against the exogeneity assumption work in opposite directions. On the one
hand, when interest rates are low there is an incentive to expand debt because
borrowing is cheap, creating a negative relationship. Thus in recessions inter-
est rates tend to be low and borrowing high. Similarly creditworthy countries
both face lower interest rates and can borrow more. On the other hand, when
interest rates are high, interest payments add to government expenditures, and
potentially to the deficit and the need for debt financing, creating a positive
relationship.
While normal, short run, debt management operations over the cycle are
possibly endogenous, responsive to interest rate expectations, the assumption
of exogeneity seems more plausible for the large changes in the share of debt
that dominate the long run historical variation. It seems unlikely that a large
number of countries simultaneously decided that low interest rates made 1941,
2009 or 2020 good years for massive borrowing. Similarly, much debt is of
longer duration and current interest rate changes may not have much effect
on debt interest payments. In addition there are other ways of responding
to increased interest payments than increased debt and as we shall see the
relationship between deficits and the change in debt is not that close.
Rachel & Summers (2019) are sceptical about the possibility of estimating
the effect of government borrowing on interest rates because of the low power
of the tests and the large number of confounding factors. The hope in this
paper is that the effect of debt and deficits on interest rates can be identified
by controlling for world interest rates and using heterogeneous panel estimators
on a large, long span, data set that exhibits great exogenous variation. This
should allow more precise estimates of the signal, which with less data may be
drowned out by the noise.
Just as the covid-19 pandemic boosted borrowing, the global financial crisis
that started in 2007 was followed by large increases in public debt in many
countries. For the 17 industrial countries considered in this paper, the average
public debt-GDP ratio increased from 61% in 2007 to 87%, in 2016. The US
and UK increased by rather more, just over 40 percentage points. Only two
of the 17, Norway and Switzerland, reduced their debt-GDP ratio. However,
despite this increase in public debt, average long interest rates fell from 2.4% to
0.3%. Interest rates were not only below the rate of growth they were negative
in many countries.
There is a considerable literature on the determination of global interest
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rates and why interest rates in the early 21st century were so low. The low
interest rates after the financial crisis partly reflect the policies of the Central
Banks, particularly the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, whose
quantitative easing, through the purchase of bonds, made safe assets in short
supply in the face of a savings glut. But this was superimposed on a longer
term trend. World real interest rates for safe and liquid assets which fluctuated
around 2 percent for more than a century, have steadily fallen over the past three
decades, for reasons that remain controversial. Of course, interest rates do rise
during debt crises. Greece is not in the sample considered in this paper, but
Greek 10 year interest rates spiked at over 30% at the height of the eurozone debt
crisis. However, by early February 2020 the yield on Greek 10 year bonds was
below 1%. This was despite a Greek debt-GDP ratio over 180% and Greek bonds
still being classified as junk, below investment grade, by the ratings agencies.
Some, like Blanchard (2019), argue that the low interest rates in the second
decade of the 21st century mean that governments could borrow at no fiscal cost
at all. In addition, the opportunities for productive public infrastructure invest-
ments in these countries could increase growth, further reducing the debt-GDP
ratio. Others, like Boskin (2020), argues against this view and concludes that
the evidence still suggests that large increases in the debt ratio could lead to
much higher taxes, lower future incomes and intergenerational inequity. In par-
ticular, he argues that Blanchard fails to take account of the effect of increasing
debt on interest rates and growth. Thus it is of some interest to estimate the
effect of debt on interest rates.
The focus in this paper is the effect of debt and deficits on long interest rates,
but there is another literature on the effect of debt on growth. Reinhart and
Rogoff (2010) estimate a debt-GDP threshold, in which ratios above 90% have
a negative effect on growth, though this estimate has been widely criticised,
for instance by Herndon et al. (2014). Chudik et al. (2017) using a sample
of forty countries over the period 1965-2010 find no evidence for a universally
applicable threshold effect in the relationship between public debt and economic
growth, although they do find significant negative effects of public debt buildup
on output growth. Most of this literature has focussed on the post World War
II period, but in certain respects this period is atypical of the longer historical
record which is considered in this paper.
Section 2 provides some background. Section 3 considers the alternative
estimators. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 reports the results of the
empirical analysis. Section 6 has some concluding comments.
2 Background
Barro (1987) provides the classic theory and estimates. Using UK data and
treating debt as exogenous, he finds a positive effect of transitory government
expenditure on long rates. Temporary increases in government purchases, show-
ing up in the sample as increases in military outlays during wartime, had positive
effects on long term interest rates. Smith (2020) examines the role of military
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expenditures in determining the UK national debt over the period 1700-2016
and confirms Barro’s conclusion of the dominant role of military expenditure
changes.
Eichengreen et al. (2019) consider public debt from a longer term histori-
cal perspective, showing how the purposes for which governments borrow have
evolved over time. The periods when debt-to-GDP ratios rose explosively tended
to result from wars, depressions and financial crises. Many of these episodes
resulted in debt-management problems resolved through debasement and re-
structuring. There were also successful debt consolidations, where governments
inheriting heavy debts ran primary surpluses for long periods in order to reduce
those burdens to sustainable levels. They analyze the economic and political
circumstances that made these successful debt consolidation episodes possible.
Hall and Sargent (2020) consider the financing of eight US wars and two insur-
rections using the Barro (1979) and Lucas & Stokey (1983) models of optimal
financing.
Given data on countries i = 1, 2, ..., N, for time periods t = 1, 2, ..., T, we
can write the government budget constraint in terms of net debt at the end
of period t + 1, Di,t+1. Debt equals the primary deficit (the negative of the
primary surplus Si,t+1 = Ti,t+1 −Gi,t+1, taxation less government expenditure
not including interest payments),3 plus interest on the previous periods debt,
where rit is the nominal interest rate, minus the increase in money supply,
(Mi,t+1 −Mit). That is:
Di,t+1 = −Si,t+1 + (1 + ri,t+1)Dit − (Mi,t+1 −Mit). (1)
Dividing through by nominal GDP, and using Yt+1 = (1 + gt+1)Yt where gt+1















This can be written as:




where di,t+1 = Di,t+1/Yi,t+1, si,t+1 = Si,t+1/Yi,t+1, mi,t+1 = ∆Mi,t+1/Mit,
kit = Mit/Yit, (1 + fi,t+1) = (1 + ri,t+1) /(1 + gi,t+1).
This makes it clear that the change in the debt-GDP ratio and the deficit
as a share of GDP are different. Other factors are involved in the relationship
between them: money growth, income growth, interest rates and previous debt
levels. Thus, in principle, one can distinguish the influence of changes in debt
and deficits on interest rates. How close the relationship is in practice is consid-
ered in Section 4. It is clear that while changes in the interest rate may influence
the change in debt by increasing interest payments, this link depends on how
the increased interest payments are financed.
3 It should be noted that the actual data used in this paper are for the total surplus, not
the primary surplus.
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The inter-temporal budget constraint requires that the market value of gov-
ernment debt is equal to the present discounted value of expected future primary
surpluses. It is expectations that are crucial for solvency. Bohn (2007) argues
that solvency cannot be inferred from the statistical properties of debt because
the inter-temporal budget constraint and transversality condition impose little
restriction on the time series properties of sit or dit. The reason for this is that
the h-period-ahead conditional expectation of an mth-order integrated variable
is at most an mth-order polynomial of the time horizon h. The discounting
in the transversality condition is exponential in h. Exponential growth domi-
nates polynomial growth of any order. Hence the discount factor (1 + r)−h will
asymptotically dominate Et(st+i).
Higher debt could prompt higher nominal rates either through a higher risk
premium, to compensate for the probability of default, or higher expected infla-
tion. Budget deficits raise nominal demand and hence potentially raise inflation
but need have little impact on default expectations since governments have the
power to repay domestic debt through taxation or printing money. The level of
domestic debt need have no impact on demand or expected inflation as long as
taxes and debt interest balance. Higher debt may be a signal that the deficit can
be safely bond financed and the government has no need to resort to inflationary
money financing.
What is crucial for the risk premium is the lender’s expectations about the
credibility of the borrower’s commitment to pay. Debt can grow rapidly as long
as the lenders expect to be paid. From 1688 to 1815 successive wars caused
British national debt to grow steadily from zero to over 200% of GDP. As
discussed in Smith (2020), lenders were happy to acquire the debt and the debt
could increase rapidly without large increases in interest rates, because Britain
was a credible borrower even in wartime. However, if lenders believe that the
government is following a time inconsistent policy, and may default on future
payments, they will not acquire the debt without a risk premium to compensate
for the probability of default. This has implications for estimation, since the
effects of debt acquisition may be heterogeneous: the same increase in debt
could have very different implications for interest rates for borrowers who differ
in credibility.
Cochrane (2019) applies the present value decompositions from asset pricing
to the present value equation for debt. He finds that about half of the variation
in the market value of debt-GDP ratio corresponds to varying forecasts of future
primary surpluses, and about half to varying discount rates, while variation in
expected growth rates is unimportant. He also comments that war finance
clearly has different roots than cyclical surpluses and deficits, and war debts are
likely resolved in different ways from other deficits.
During the period considered here, wars are important. Grossman & Han
(1993, 1999) provide a theory of war finance and sovereign debt. As emphasised
above, the ability of a sovereign state to issue war debt depends critically on the
lenders’expectations about the servicing of these debts. The lender faces two
distinct risks. Firstly there is the danger that the borrower will default if de-
feated, the victor typically does not pay the debts of the vanquished. Secondly,
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even if it is not defeated, but suffers negative material consequences from the
war, the borrower may not fully service their debt. Thus debt service is con-
tingent on circumstances, a form of risk sharing between lender and borrower,
which provides the borrower some insurance. They show that the two functions
of war debt - inter-temporal consumption smoothing, through tax smoothing,
and risk sharing - are complementary.
3 Estimators
The JST macrohistory dataset is a panel where both the cross section dimen-
sion, i = 1, 2, ..., N, and the time series dimension, t = 1, 2, ..., T, are quite large.
Such panels present a range of choices about the treatment of: cross section
dependence, dynamics and heterogeneity over units or time. Different treat-
ments of heterogeneity correspond to different estimators and thus examining
the sensitivity of results to the choice of estimator is an important robustness
test.
Cross section dependence is modelled by using world averages, particularly of
the long interest rate, for each year as explanatory variables.4 The dynamics is
modelled using an error correction model, ECM, type of autoregressive distrib-
uted lag, ARDL, model. ARDL estimates are robust to the orders of integration
or cointegration of the variables and this is an important issue given the range
of countries considered. In the baseline model, the change in long interest rates,
∆rit is explained by a set of explanatory variables, denoted xit, discussed in the
next section, and the lagged change in interest rates since momentum effects
might be important.
The estimators used differ in the degree of homogeneity imposed. The mean
group, MG, estimator, Pesaran & Smith (1995), averages over the heterogeneous
country specific coeffi cient estimates in
∆rit = ai + b
′
i∆xit − λi(ri,t−1 − θ′ixi,t−1) + δi∆ri,t−1 + u1,it, (3)
where λi are the adjustment coeffi cients and θi the long run effects. The non-
parametric standard errors based on the country specific estimates of the co-
effi cients are robust to serial correlation or heteroskedasticity in the individual
equations. However, the MG estimators may be sensitive to outliers.
The pooled mean group, PMG, estimator, Pesaran, Shin & Smith (1999),
has heterogeneous short run coeffi cients but homogeneous long run coeffi cients
∆rit = ai + b
′
i∆xit − λi(ri,t−1 − θ′xi,t−1) + δi∆ri,t−1 + u2,it. (4)
This can allow for no long-run effect in some countries if λi = 0.
The one way fixed effects, FE1, estimator has homogeneous slopes but het-
erogeneous intercepts
∆rit = ai + b
′
∆xit − λ(ri,t−1 − θ′xi,t−1) + δ∆ri,t−1 + u3,it. (5)
4Cross section averages also filter out common factors as in the Pesaran (2006) correlated
common effect estimator.
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We will not use another possible estimator, the two way fixed effects, FE2,
which adds a time effect, which can capture any flexible trend which has the
same effect on each unit:
∆rit = ai + at + b
′
∆x̃it − λ(ri,t−1 − θ′x̃i,t−1) + δ∆ri,t−1 + u4,it, (6)
where x̃it = (πit, dit, sit)′ excludes the country invariant cross section means.
Information criteria prefer FE1 including means, which can also be given a more
interesting economic interpretation.
The PMG and FE may be subject to the heterogeneity bias discussed in
Pesaran & Smith (1995) which would bias λ towards zero, slower adjustment.
This bias does not decline with the sample size. The MG is not subject to this
bias thus may be expected to show faster adjustment. Since T is quite large
the Nickel (1980) small sample bias for the FE1 estimator, which works in the
opposite direction to the heterogeneity bias, seems unlikely to be a problem.
Heterogeneity over time will be allowed for by considering sub-periods.
4 Data
The dependent variable is the long interest rate, rit. This is the rate at which
governments are likely to borrow to finance their deficits and is more likely to
be market determined than the short rate, which is a policy variable. A con-
tractionary monetary and fiscal policy would involve a high short term policy
interest rates, an increasing surplus and debt reductions. Conversely, expansion-
ary policies would involve low policy rates, fiscal deficits and debt expansions.
In the light of the background discussion in section 2, the main independent
variables are the inflation rate, πit, the debt-GDP ratio, dit, the government
surplus as a share of GDP, sit, and the world long interest rate, rt, calculated
as the cross section mean over the sample for that year. This set constitutes
the vector xit = (πit, dit, sit, rt)′, used in section 3.
The data are taken from the JST macro history database, Jorda, Schularick
and Taylor (2017). Jorda et al. (2019) provides further discussion of the rate
of return data. JST provide data for 17 countries over the period 1870-2016.
There are clearly issues with the measurement of economic variables over such a
long span. For instance, there is considerable public accounting flexibility about
the definition of the government net national debt and of the surplus/deficit.
Boskin (2020, footnote 6) gives a range of reasons why offi cial debt and deficit
figures can give an inaccurate picture of governments liabilities. However, he
uses the offi cial figure for simplicity and comparability, as do we. The data are
assembled from a wide variety of sources with different definitions of variables
and countries vary because of boundary changes. However, JST is a carefully
compiled database which has been widely used.5 While the series may be noisy,
there is a lot of variation, so the signal-noise ratio may be high.
The interest rate is on long term government bonds, with a maturity typically
around 10 years, but sometimes longer like the British Consols which were
5There is detailed documentation of the sources at http://www.macrohistory.net/data/ .
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perpetuals. From about 1950 the maturity is fairly accurately defined at about
10 years. If rit is the yield on bonds and the rate of CPI inflation is
πit = 100 ∗∆ lnCPIit,
then the ex post real long rate is calculated as
rrit = 100 ∗ {(1 + rit/100)/(1 + ∆ lnCPIit)− 1}.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables. The number of observa-
tions is not the same for all variables and there is a sample selection issue, since
the data tend to be missing at times of crisis. For some variables the cross sec-
tion means, calculated from available data for that year, are also shown. Since
there is some missing data, the mean of the cross-section means is not the same
as the mean of the variable. The table gives values for the long interest rate,
rit, its mean, rt, the short rate rsit, the rate of inflation, πit, its mean, πt, the
real long interest rate, rrit, its mean, rrt the debt-GDP ratio, dit, its change,
∆dit and the surplus-GDP ratio, sit. All are in percent. For the variables, other
than ∆dit, one generally cannot reject a unit root, not surprisingly given the
big breaks in the data. For instance, in the case of long interest rates, regressing
the change on a constant, lagged level and lagged change, the only country to
reject a unit root at the 5% level is Portugal where rejection probably comes
from a number of bouts of high interest rates with return to low rates, creating
an impression of mean reversion.
.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, percentages .
.
% Mean SD Min Max
rit 5.53 3.06 -0.14 23.72
rt 5.52 2.26 1.00 13.39
rsit 4.80 3.23 -2.00 21.27
πit 4.72 43.32 -47.28 2077.88
πt 4.72 11.57 -6.88 125.46
rrit 2.40 7.12 -69.26 55.03
rrt 2.35 4.58 -17.94 15.59
dit 53.45 39.12 1.90 269.80
∆dit 0.30 6.57 -57.31 70.59
sit -1.86 5.28 -75.17 20.08
Not only does the debt-GDP ratio vary widely, so does its change, reflecting
the exogenous crises that drive its variation. Five percent of the changes are
greater than 9.3 percentage points and five percent below -7.3.
The descriptive statistics raise an important issue. The estimates of the ex
post real rate are very sensitive to the fat tails of the inflation distribution. In-
flation ranges between -50% and +2000% and the real rate between -70% and
+55%, despite the fact that at times of very high inflation there was often no
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long rate quoted, so no real rate included in this sample. What matters for the
nominal rate on long term bonds is the ex ante real rate based on expected infla-
tion. Inflation shocks, positive or negative, generate large unexpected windfall
gains and losses. They must be unexpected since everyone would invest if they
expected a real gain of 55% and nobody would invest if they expected a real
loss of 70%, which are the minimum and maximum of the observed real rate.
Given the fat tails in the estimated real rate, the analysis will be conducted
using the nominal rather than the real long rate as the dependent variable. The
interpretation for this is that the explanatory variables, including current infla-
tion, world interest rates and lagged interest rates, are providing information
about future longer term inflation. Consider a model for the long interest rate,
where expected inflation over the h year life of the bond, E(πi,t+h | zit), is
conditional on information at time t, zt, which includes the variables that also
determine the real rate:
rit = E(πi,t+h | zit) + β′zit + εit,
E(πi,t+h | zit) = φzit,
rit = (φ+ β)
′
zit + εit.
The coeffi cient of debt, in this interpretation, picks up both the direct effect
of debt increases on the nominal rate, through the real risk premium required
to persuade lenders to hold more debt, and the indirect effect of the debt in-
crease on expected inflation. The nominal equation with inflation included as
an explanatory variable could be regarded as the real equation removing the re-
striction of a minus one coeffi cient on current inflation, or equivalently relaxing
the strong assumption that E(πi,t+h | zit) = πit.
There will inevitably be considerable uncertainty about how inflation ex-
pectations are formed over such a long period, which includes quite different
regimes. Over parts of this period, certainly during the gold standard regime,
inflation was not persistent but dominated by transitory noise, so the current
inflation rate was a very poor indicator of future inflation. Thus one would not
expect expected inflation or nominal interest rates to respond to current infla-
tion. Alogoskoufis & Smith (1991) examine the persistence of inflation under
the different exchange rate regimes using a similar span of data.
To clarify the role of global interest rates, consider the extent to which
nominal long interest rates moved together over this period. Some data are
missing and only 11 countries had data on long interest rates for the whole 147
years.6 For these 11 countries 80% of the variance of the nominal long rate is
explained by the first principal component. This is close to the mean, giving
almost identical weights, around 0.32, to interest rates in all countries except
for Japan 0.13 and Portugal 0.23. All the correlations are positive, the mean
of the 55 correlations is 0.75 the median 0.87. Of the 11 correlations less than
0.5, 10 are with Japan, the other between the UK and Portugal is 0.498. Thus
6These are Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Portugal, Sweden and USA. The other countries are Belgium, Finland, Germany, Norway,
Spain, Switzerland.
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it seems plausible that a world interest rate drives the rates of the individual
countries. For estimation, the world interest rate for each year is estimated as
the unweighted average over all the countries that have data for that year. In
the early part of the period the UK rate was central, in the later part the US
rate, but since they all move closely together the world rate seems a safe choice.
To examine the relationship between the country specific interest rates and
the global average,. the change in the long interest rate, ∆rit, was regressed on
the change in the average, ∆rt its lag rt−1,, the lagged interest rate, ri,t−1, and
the lagged change, ∆ri,t−1. The mean group estimates were:
∆rit = −0.000 +0.9674 ∆rt +0.133 rt−1
(0.052) (0.057) (0.022)
−0.133 ri,t−1 +0.055 ∆ri,t−1 +uit
(0.022) (0.034)
Both the average short run effect and the average long run effect are very
close to one. The average standard error of regression is 0.69, just over half a
percentage point. There is strong evidence for a short run effect of the world
interest rate in every country. The change in the global average interest rate
was always very significant, with the smallest t ratio being 5.59 and 10 of the 17
having t ratios over 10. The evidence for a long run relationship in every country
is weaker. The Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) bounds test with unrestricted
intercept, no trend, and one independent variable, rejected the null of no long
run relationship at the 5% level, using the I(1) critical values, in 8 countries
and using the I(0) critical value in 3 more countries. The countries where the
convergence to the world interest rate was not significant were a motley group:
Denmark, Finland, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
Above it was noted that, in principle, deficits and the change in debt are
distinct. To examine how distinct they are in practice, a simple fixed effects
regression was estimated explaining the change in the debt-GDP ratio by the
surplus as a share of GDP. Both are proportions, standard error in parentheses.
Although they are significantly related, only about half the surplus is reflected
in the change in debt and the R2 is small.
∆dt = αi −0.504 st +ûit R2 = 0.122
(0.029) SER = 0.061
.
Adding two lags of surplus only increases the R2 to 0.135. This indicates that
there is potentially enough independent variation in the surplus and the change
in debt to separately measure their effects.
5 Empirical results
The baseline model makes the long interest rate, rit a first order ECM function
of the inflation rate, πit, the debt-GDP ratio, dit, the government surplus/deficit
as a share of GDP, sit, the world long interest rate, rt, calculated as the cross
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section mean over the sample for that year and the lagged change in interest
rates. Table 2 gives the results for the MG, PMG and FE1 estimators. The
standard errors on FE1 tend to be smaller, as one would expect, but this does
not generally change the judgements on significance, which are similar for the
three estimators. The change in inflation is always significant at the 5% level,
but with very small coeffi cients that are far from unity. The change in debt-GDP
ratio and change in world interest rate are always significant with coeffi cients
around one. The lagged dependent variable is always very significant and the
speed of adjustment is, as one would expect from the heterogeneity bias, fastest
for the MG slowest for FE1. The change in surplus is never significant and the
lagged change in the interest rate is significant only for FE1.
The long-run effect of the world interest rate on national interest rates is
always very significant with a coeffi cient around one. The estimated long run
effect of debt is negative, but is never significant. The result can be interpreted
as indicating that there is no equilibrium level of the debt-GDP ratio. This
is consistent with the large variety of debt-GDP ratios observed in the data
and with the observation that very different levels of debt-GDP are consistent
with similar interest rates. The long-run effect of surplus is never significant and
the long-run effect of inflation is significant only for FE1, again with a small
coeffi cient. The FE1 with mean interest rates seems to remove a lot of the cross
section dependence. Both Akaike and Schwarz information criteria prefer the
FE1 with average interest rates to a FE2 with time effects. The Pesaran CD
test for no cross-section dependence based on the correlations in the FE1 was
-1.83, p=0.0668, though the bias corrected scaled LM test based on the squared
correlations rejects, see Pesaran (2015).
The interest rate is in percent, with a mean of 5.5%, the debt-GDP ratio is
a proportion, with a mean of 0.53. Thus the unit coeffi cient on the change in
debt indicates that a one percentage point, pp, increase in the debt-GDP ratio
will cause a 0.01 change in the interest rate, one basis point, bps. This is of
the same order of magnitude, though at the low end, of the estimates, 1-6bps
with an average of 3.5bps, given in table 2 of Rachel and Summers (2019). The
estimates in Table 2 suggest that it is the change in debt that matters, not the
deficit or the level of debt.7
7Dropping the change and lagged surplus from the equation had relatively little effect and
the coeffi cient (standard error) of the change in debt was 0.627 (0.226) and the long run effect
-0.676 (0.431).
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Table 2. Dependent variable: change in long rates, coeffi cients and
(standard errors); alternative estimators.
MG PMG FE1
Short run: b
∆πit 0.010 0.008 0.009
(0.004) (0.0002) (0.002)
∆dit 1.030 0.863 0.698
(0.387) (0.339) (0.256)
∆sit 1.424 1.189 1.254
(1.033) (0.881) (0.641)
∆rt 0.946 0.823 0.945
(0.053) (0.055) (0.030)
∆ri,t−1 0.047 0.035 0.055
(0.037) (0.034) (0.018)
Adjustment: −λ
ri,t−1 -0.176 -0.117 -0.106
(0.014) (0.015) (−0.009)
Long run: θ
πit 0.016 0.018 0.053
(0.020) (0.013) (0.022)
dit -0.475 -0.011 -0.723
(0.715) (0.285) (0.449)
sit 3.938 -0.100 2.573
(5.281) (2.259) (3.816)
rt 0.951 1.107 0.922
(0.104) (0.036) (0.063)
N Obs 2207 2207 2207
A range of robustness tests were carried out using the FE1 estimator. Changes
and lagged levels of world averages of inflation and debt were also included but
were not significant,8 nor were changes and lags of log per capita GDP and log
population. Since the very small coeffi cient on inflation might reflect the thick
tails of its empirical distribution, the equation was re-estimated by fixed effects
using just the 2157 observations where inflation lay within ±20%. The estimate
(standard error) of its short run effect was 0.013 (0.003) and its long run effect
0.093 (0.032); still very small. There is no indication of asymmetric effects of
debt changes. When a dummy for debt increasing and its interaction with the
change in debt-GDP ratio was included they were not individually or jointly
(p=0.237) significant.
The results are not robust to treating these countries as closed economies
and excluding world interest rates. When the change and lagged level of world
interest rates are removed from the FE1 model, the R2 for the equation ex-
8Because the panel is unbalanced and debt levels differ a lot over countries, it could be
that adding another country to the average could distort the results. However results using
average debt of the 8 countries for which there was continuous data gave similar results,
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plaining the change in interest rates falls massively from 0.388 to 0.081. The
short run coeffi cient of debt (standard error) falls from a significant positive
effect, 0.698 (0.256), to an insignificant one, 0.031 (0.312); while the long-run
effect of debt goes from being insignificantly negative, -0.724 (0.449), to being
significantly so, -5.005 (0.986). Not only would one want to include world rates
on theoretical and empirical grounds, but excluding it produces the very im-
plausible result that in the long run increased debt levels are associated with
lower national interest rates. The change in coeffi cient implies that they are
also associated with lower world interest rates.
Returning to the main model, the evidence for the influence of world interest
rates on individual countries is very strong. The effect of the change in average
rate is significantly positive in every country, while the lagged average rate was
positive in every country and significant in all but Finland, Japan, and the UK.
The coeffi cient of the lagged dependent variable was significant, using standard
critical values, in all but Finland. For the other variables the evidence is less
clear. The change in inflation was significant only in Norway and Portugal,
lagged inflation was never significant. The effect of the change in debt-GDP
was positive and significant in Spain. Lagged debt was positive and significant
in Belgium and Portugal, negative and significant in Denmark, Switzerland,
Japan and Australia. Thus a lot of the evidence on the effect of the change in
debt comes from pooling the countries. The change in surplus was positive and
significant in Canada, lagged surplus was positive and significant in Denmark
and Canada negative and significant in France. The lagged change in interest
rates was significantly positive in four countries, significantly negative in two.
The R2 for the FE1 is 0.388, which seems a reasonable fit for explaining
changes in interest rates over such a long span, heterogeneous panel. Although
the estimates of the less well determined coeffi cients are quite dispersed, the
heterogeneity across countries does not cause a large reduction in fit. The FE1,
with 27 parameters, has a standard error of 0.6860, compared with 0.6195 for
the heterogeneous estimator with 187 parameters. For FE1, the hypothesis that
all the intercepts are equal give a F(16,2180) statistic of 1.68 which only just
rejects homogeneity at the 5% level, though the statistic may not be reliable
given differing variances across countries and some remaining cross-section de-
pendence. The mean group estimate of the adjustment coeffi cient is very tightly
estimated at 0.18 with a standard error of 0.01 and this standard error is ro-
bust to serial correlation or heteroskedasticity of the individual country specific
equations. The mean group estimator can be sensitive to outliers, but this does
not seem to be the case here since the range of the coeffi cient on the lagged
dependent variable is -0.10 to -0.29.
To examine stability over time, the model was estimated on three sub-
samples: the gold standard, 1870-1913, the turbulent years, 1914-1946, and
post World War II, 1947-2016. Given that the differences between the three
estimators in Table 2 are not large and to conserve degrees of freedom, the fixed
effect estimator is used. The FE1 estimates of the coeffi cients are given in Table
3 and, in contrast to Table 2, the coeffi cients of the lagged variables rather than
the long run effects are reported.
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Table 3. Dependent variable: change in long rates, coeffi cients
(and standard errors); FE1 estimates by sub-period.
1872-2016 1872-1913 1914-1946 1947-2016
∆πit 0.009 0.011 0.001 0.041
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
∆dit 0.698 1.345 0.110 2.004
(0.256) (0.432) (0.321) (0.626)
∆sit 1.254 -3.569 -0.508 2.986
(0.641) (2.464) (0.856) (1.286)
∆rit 0.945 0.539 1.074 0.924
(0.030) (0.098) (0.096) (0.037)
ri,t−1 -0.106 -0.148 -0.281 -0.110
(0.009) (0.016) (0.035) (0.013)
πi,t−1 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.030
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
di,t−1 -0.077 -0.093 0.104 -0.032
(0.047) (0.172) (0.146) (0.082)
si,t−1 0.273 -4.666 -1.086 0.852
(0.405) (2.380) (0.616) (0.855)
ri,t−1 0.098 0.038 0.312 0.089
(0.011) (0.032) (0.058) (0.015)
∆ri,t−1 0.055 0.288 0.070 0.019
(0.018) (0.035) (0.044) (0.024)
R2 0.388 0.343 0.332 0.454
SER 0.681 0.419 0.655 0.774
SSR 1024 99 185 679
MLL -2285 -310 -443 -1335
N Obs 2207 588 459 1160
AIC 2.095 1.14 2.05 2.35
BIC 2.165 1.34 2.29 2.47
The change in the world interest rate is highly significant in all three periods.
The lagged world rate is significant in the second and third periods, when its long
run coeffi cient is again close to one. Consistent with the idea that globalisation
has increased over time, the effect of the change in the world interest rate is
much smaller in the first period and the lagged level is not significant. Both
the change and level of the world interest rate are significant in the middle
period despite the obstacles to capital mobility. Lagged national interest rates
are always significant. The effect of the other variables is not so clear cut.
The change in inflation is significant in the first and third periods, though
with very small coeffi cients. The change in debt-GDP is significant in the first
and third periods. The change in surplus is significant in the third period,
though with a positive sign, which is not what one would expect. Both the
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change and level of the surplus have negative effects in the first two periods
though they are not significant. Lagged debt-GDP and lagged surplus are never
significant,
The total standard error for the three periods is 0.674 compared to 0.681 for
the pooled. Although the difference in the coeffi cients appears to be statisti-
cally significant F(54,2123)=2.40, the variances of the three periods are not the
same, which is required for the parameter equality test. The standard errors of
regression go from 42 basis points in the first period to 77 in the last.
Despite being estimated over a very long sample, the whole sample FE1 fits
recent years reasonably well, despite the crisis. The average FE1 residual for
the 17 countries over the 11 years 2006-2016 was 0.006, so there is no obvious
bias. The standard deviation was 0.593, which is less than the standard error of
regression of 0.681. The large residuals reflected the euro-zone crisis. In 2011,
the predicted interest rate for Portugal was 5.6% the actual was 10.2%. This
was the largest positive error in the sample. The largest negative error was
also for Portugal in 2013, -3.18, interest rates came down faster than the model
predicted. Italy and Spain also had large positive residuals during the crisis.
6 Conclusion
Estimates from the Jorda-Shularick-Taylor macrohistory database, for 17 coun-
tries over 1870-2016, indicate that the dominant influence on national long in-
terest rates is world interest rates. This is in accord with the recent literature
which has emphasised the importance of global forces such as Del Negro et
al. (2018), Jorda & Taylor (2019) and Rachel & Summers (2019). While they
emphasise the recent importance of the global dimension and the financial in-
tegration of the advanced economies, the results in this paper indicate that, as
economic historians have long emphasised, global financial interactions are a
long-standing feature of the international economy.
The change in the debt-GDP ratio has a significant positive effect on the
nominal long interest rate. A one percentage point increase in the debt-GDP
ratio causes approximately a one basis point increase in interest rates, an effect of
the same order of magnitude as that reported by Rachel & Summers (2019). The
level of debt is not significant, which is consistent with the fact that countries
with very different debt-GDP ratios face very similar interest rates and the
surplus/deficit does not seem to matter either for long interest rates. While
significant, the coeffi cient of the change in debt in the interest rate equation is
not very large, perhaps because it does not capture a pure ceteris paribus effect.
Instead it captures the joint effect of what tends to happen at the same time as
large changes in debt which are likely to include changes in private borrowing
and saving.
The effect of inflation on interest rates was small, probably because inflation
expectations were not very sensitive to current national inflation over much of
the sample and global inflation is embodied in the world interest rate. The long
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interest rate equation seemed reasonably stable over time and there was not
much heterogeneity over countries. The results for long interest rates seem to
support the idea that averaging both over countries and over a long span of data
can increase the precision of the estimates and reduce the effect of confounding
influences.
A policy implication is that the large increases in debt-GDP ratios caused
by the 2020 pandemic may not increase interest rates very much.
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